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Fifty years after its original drafting, the Gemuw constitution has seen its text amended many times. 
Indeed, among OEeD countries, the Gnmdgeslt'{ has one of the· highest rates of constitutional 
change. This paper analyzes these changes. It does so in a quantitative manner in its first section, 
before proceeding to ask how the numerous changes can be explained. 'Ib.tee approaches from the 
legal and political science literature are presented: one emphasizing historical-structural factors, one 
analyzing changes as constitutional revisionism, and an institutional approach which focuses on the 
conditions for constitutional amendment. The strengths and weaknesses of each approach are then 
compared and contrasted, before the article concludes with an assessment of the characteristics of 
Gemuw constitutional policy. 
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2 
ready been criticized in the discipline many years ago (Steinberg 1980: 390; 
see also Schaub 1984: 3f.), the number of systematic analyses on the changes 
in the constitution grew hardly above a handful: there are contributions by 
Rol!,nagel (1981), Bryde (1982), Schaub (1984) and Hofmann (1987) as well 
as Robbers (1989) and more recently Kenntner (1997). But this low count 
does not seem to be a problem characteristic of the discipline of constitu­
tional law in today's Federal Republic: already in 1961, Karl Loewenstein 
complained in a lecture on the topic that "the problematique of constitu­
tional change has been remarkably neglected in constitutional law, given its 
otherwise comprehensive scientific coverage." (Loewenstein 1961: 7). 
Analysing the changes of the Federal Republic's Grundgesetz, however, 
is further complicated through the lack of a consolidated and critical edition 
of the history of its text. Scholars who embark upon this endeavour have 
to do a fair amount of digging to understand the changes in the Federal 
constitution over the last five decades. Although all editions of the text give 
the dates of the acts amending the constitution as well as the articles con­
cerned, this may be of limited help if one has more specific questions: for 
example, what Article 142a (inserted in 1954 and deleted in 1968) had dealt 
with.2 And by merely looking at the present form of Article 143 one does not 
realise that before "regulations on temporary deviations from constitutional 
provisions in the area acceding through unification" (since 1990), this part of 
the constitution had already dealt with measures against high treason (1949 
until 1951) and regulations on the use of armed forces in case of domestic 
emergency (1956 until 1968). Even the more voluminous commentaries on 
the constitution (e.g. Sachs 1996) only talk about the changes in existing 
articles, but give neither the wording of previous versions nor the circum­
stances of and reasons for change; in the case of articles deleted from the 
constitution, even this is missing. To sum up, the scholar interested in the 
historical development of the Grundgesetz is faced with a difficult situation, 
which only a critical, annotated edition of the Grundgesetz in its present 
form could help overcome.3 
2The article decreed that the treaties of May 1952 (Treaty on Germany and Treaty 
on European Defense Community) did not conflict with the constitution. This has been 
strongly criticised as a clear loi d'occasion (Loewenstein 1961: 59). 
3 An overview of the changed articles in the Grundgesetz together with an index and 
dates of change can be found in Schindler (1994: 1132-1137). Schaub (1984) gives a list 
of all proposed changes in the Grundgesetz up to 1978. The original text of 1949 can be 
found in Fischer (1989: 411-(41), a version with the text changes in Hildebrandt (1992) 
- unfortunately only up to Oct. 1, 1991. Seifert (1977) also gives the text of all changes, 
but only up to the 34th act to change the Grundgesetz (August 1976). Although a fourth 
edition of his book came out in 1983 (under a different title), this is of no additional 
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1 Introduction 
The fiftieth anniversary of the Grundgesetz in 1999 seems a good opportunity 
to look back on the development of the German constitution over the last 
decades. The Grundgesetz of the end of the century is no longer that of the 
year 1949 - at least literally. There is widespread agreement that it has been 
changed often - although RoB.nagel (1981: 1) is wrong when he claims that 
"no constitution in the world" has been changed as often as the Grundgesetz. 
There is much less unanimity, however, with respect to the - undoubtedly 
more interesting question of the effects of these changes. Is the constitu­
tion's anniversary "cause for a grateful look back" (Hesse 1990: 16), is the 
Grundgesetz "in its core untouched" and was "the constitutional consensus 
of 1949 [ ... J preserved until today" (Stern 1993: 32, 35)?1 Can we say "the 
Grundgesetz has proven itself" (Ellwein 1974: 16), and can it be claimed 
that while "the overall profile of the constitution changed" (Hofmann 1987: 
281), the "success of the Grundgesetz" is without doubt (Grimm 1989: 1311)? 
Those who put forward such generally positive evaluations are accused of be­
ing apologists. Thus critics maintain that the original constitution was "dis­
figured" in the last decades (Stuby 1974: 25), and the constitution's demo­
cratic content was "systematically hollowed out" (Abendroth 1974: 143). 
More forcefully, the constitutional amendments are said to have created a 
''new constitutional reality" which has "aligned the constitutional order of 
the Federal RepUblic to that of an authoritarian state" (Seifert 1977: 33, 
46). 
To negotiate one's way through the maze of opinions and form a well­
founded and reasoned opinion seems not an easy task in the face of such 
contradictory assessments. This is all the more the case since there clearly 
is a lack of political science literature on the constitution, something already 
noted in the 1970s (Grimm 1978: 274). Students of constitutional law have 
also complained that political science and sociology have so far contributed 
little to our understanding of constitutional developments (Bryde 1982: 24, 
112), a situation not much altered since (Benz 1993: 882). 
On the other hand, political scientists should limit their soul-searching on 
this topic, for the criticism can be returned to constitutional lawyers them­
selves. Given the central role of the constitution for constitutional law, and 
given the numerous and substantial changes in the Grundgesetz, it is amaz­
ing to see how little has been published on this by legal scholars. Although 
the lack of research on the historical development of the constitution had al­
l All translations from German sources are by the author. 
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Preamble ! 1 1 
I I 3 6 5 I 1 15 
.II 1 2 I 1 1 1 1 7 1 13 
III I 3 2 2 16 1 1 15 
IV 1 2 3 
1 IVa 1 1 
IV 2 1 3 
VI 1 1 I 2! 
VII 2 1 ·2 11 6 1 I 23 I 46 
VIII 2 2 2 1 i 7 14 
· VIlla 2 1 3 
IX 2 2 11 1 1 17 
X 1 7 13 1 3 25 
· Xa 14 1 15 
XI 2 4 1 3 3 4 17 
I 
.1:: 3 27 5 3 69 11 8 0 0 1 6 52 5 190 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Table 1: Amendments of the constitution by chapter and time 
vary quite a lot in the extent to which they actually change the constitution: 
while some merely replace a few words in one paragraph of a single article,7 
other acts change several articles at the same time, add whole chapters and 
articles to the constitution and abolish others at the same time.s Obviously 
a more precise indicator is needed. If one counts on the basis of articles 
changed, then already much more differentiated results are obtained.9 In 
rare cases, there are reforms of the constitution in which there are several 
changes to an article at the same time - e.g. in the catalogue-like enumera­
tions of legislative powers or in the parts of the constitution that deal with 
the distribution of tax revenues.lO These can only be fully appreciated if 
every alteration in the text is being counted. l1 Since this appears to be the 
most selective indicator, it will be used in the following analysis. 
7 Cf. the 35th act of December 21, 1983. 
sCf. the 17th act of June 24, 1968 ("emergency constitution"). 
9This indicator is used e.g. by Bryde 1982 and Schaub 1984. 
10 E.g. in the 8th act of December 24, 1956. 
llThis indicator is also used by Loewenstein (1961: 59). 
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This paper focuses primarily on the changes in the constitution since its 
drafting. Most prior work on this topic was published more than a decade 
ago, at a time of relative stability in the constitution. It remains to be 
seen whether their conclusions have been confirmed by the further develop­
ments, especially following German unification. The first part of the paper 
therefore analyses the constitution's structure and changes in a quantitative 
fashion. The second part deals with the question of how the great number of 
changes in the constitution can be explained. Three models will be presented· 
and compared, before finally an assessment of the characteristics of German 
constitutional policy will be given. 
Amendments in the Grundgesetz: quantitative 
analysis 
Comparing today's Grundgesetz4 with the original text of 1949, it becomes 
evident at first sight that there were substantial changes in the constitution. 
While the Grundgesetz consisted of 146 articles in 1949, it had grown to 
171 articles by 1980 (Kommers 1989: 141).5 Until 1994, another 12 articles 
had been added to bring the total to 183. 40 articles were added during the 
course of 50 years, three articles deleted, so that the net growth was 37 con­
stitutional articles. As a consequence, the text length has been substantially 
altered: from 10636 words in 1949 it had grown to 17050. words by early 
1994; after the changes initiated by the Joint Constitutional Commission in 
late 1994 and some further additions, the text length was 19121 words in the 
summer of 1998. The text of the Grundgesetz has thus nearly been doubled 
over that of 1949. 
To analyse the changes in the Grundgesetz further, the question of the 
most suitable indicator has first to be dealt with. Three different measures 
are being used in the literature. The simplest is that of the number of acts 
amending the Grundgesetz - but at the same time it is the roughtest mea­
sure.6 For the 46 such acts that have been passed prior to summer 1999 
use, since there were no further changes in the constitution up to then. The relevant 
documents about the conditions under which the Grundgesetz was drafted can be found 
in Huber (1951), and the history of the drafting of individual articles is documented in 
Doemming/Fiisslein/Matz (1951). More recently, a helpful edition of all stages of the text 
can be found in Bauer/Jestaedt (1997). 
"All analyses in this section relate to the version of the Grundgesetz after passage of 
the the 46th amending act of July 22, 1998. 
SUnless further indicated, all calculations given in this section are by the author. 
6It is used e.g. by Robbers 1989 or Grimm 1994: 376. 
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!Chapter I No. of articles 1949 I No. of changes I Changes per article I 
Preamble I 1 1 1 
: I 19 15 0.79 I 
:II I 18 I 13 I 0.72 
III 12 15 1.25 
IV 4 3 0.75 
IVa 1 
V 8 3 0.38 
! VI 8 2 0.25 
: VII 13 46 3.54 
VIII 9 14 1.56 I 
VIlla - 3 
IX 13 17 1.31 ! 
I 
X 11 25 2.27 
Xa - 15 
! XI 31 17 0.55 
E 147 : 190 1.20 
Table 2: Intensity of change in the various chapters of the Grundgesetz 
that since 1949, three whole chapters have been added to the constitution. 
These are the chapters IVa (Joint Committee), VIlla (Joint Tasks) and Xa 
(Defense). 
How can we explain the numerous changes? 
The task of a constitution is that of securing a "basic order" (Hesse 1994) 
or a "framework" (Bockenforde 1992) for a state. As the state's founda­
tion, constitutions establish the "rules of the game" for the political process. 
Such rules, however, have to be of a certain permanence - indeed, that is 
what is characteristic of rules. Were they to be changed continuously and 
were each game to be played according to different rules, there wouldn't be 
much of a point of talking about rules (Brennan/Buchanan 1993). Consti­
tutions therefore are designed for longevity. Thus they are an institutional 
answer to the demand for stability. Constitutional provisions should not be 
at the disposition of the government or the parliamentary majority of the 
day. Nevertheless, few will doubt that there is in principle a need to adjust 
a constitution, for norms which may have been adequate at the time of its 
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Counted in this way, the German Grundgesetz has been altered 190 times 
between its proclamation and the summer of 1998 (cf. Table 1). On average, 
each article in the constitution has been changed somewhat more than once 
1.2 times, to be precise (cf. Table 2), and there were 3.8 changes in each 
of the last fifty years of the Federal Republic's existence. Obviously, these 
are just averages. As a closer analysis of the two tables demonstrates, there 
are great differences in the intensity of constitutional emendation - both over 
time and with respect to the chapters that were amended. 
2.1 Amendments over time 
As Table 1 shows, there are two clear peaks in the distribution of consti­
tutional changes over time: the fifth (1965-69) and the twelfth (1990-94) 
legislative periods, each of which saw in excess of 50 changes in the text of 
the constitution. There were also a lot of changes in the second legislative 
period (1953-57). Overall, two thirds of the changes (126) fall into the pe­
riod between the first and the seventh legislative period, and one third (63) 
into the time since German unification. Between 1976 and 1990, that is for 
almost 15 years, there were no changes in the Grundgesetz - with one ex­
ception: in 1983 there was a change in Article 21.12 Thus we can distinguish 
three periods very clearly: a long period in the first 25 years of the Federal 
Republic in which there were regular changes in the constitution, a period 
of 14 years with nearly complete stability in the text, and finally a period of 
intense change around the time of German unification. 
2.2 Amendments according to chapter 
There are also clear distinctions with respect to sectoral change. As Table 2 
demonstrates, the chapters VII (Federal Legislative Powers) and X (Finance) 
have been regularly subjected to change: there were 46 and 25 alterations in 
the text, respectively. The focus on these chapters is further emphasized by 
the fact that these are not particularly large chapters in the Grundgesetz ­
if one calculates the number of changes per chapter, there are clear maxima 
here with on average 3.54 (Federal Legislative Powers) and 2.27 (Finance) 
changes per article. Most of the other chapters in the constitution do not 
vary a lot in terms of their intensity of change, measured in this way. Two 
chapters clearly display above-average stability: chapters V (President) and 
VI (Government) have been changed very little. Lastly, it remains to be said 
12This change demanded from political parties to report not only on the origins of their 
funds (old version), but also on the uses of their funds. 
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into the constitution in 1949 as a temporary solution, to be abolished upon 
the passage of new regulations for the respective parts of criminallaw.15 In 
the case of the fiscal constitution, only provisional regulations had been set 
down in the constitution of 1949, which had to have their validity extended 
twice before a permanent formulation could be agreed upon.16 Lastly, there 
are also a number of constitutional amendments which clearly qualify as a 
product of the historical situation: the regulations on Lastenausgleich (the 
system of financial compensation for losses suffered in World War II), on 
liabilities of the Reich, and on legislative powers concerning war graves and 
liabilities resulting from the war (cf. Bryde 1982: 129). 
On the other hand, the structure and character of the Grundgesetz is 
also mentioned as a cause for the repeated amendments. The permanent 
need for change is blamed on the German constitution's tendency to achieve 
"comprehensive regulation not by means of abstract and elastic formulations, 
but by casuistic regulation of details" (Bryde 1982: 121). This is particularly 
true in the areas of the fiscal constitution and the separation of powers 
between the Bund and the Lander. Taken together with the observation 
that a large part of the changes in the Grundgesetz takes place in precisely 
these chapters (cf. Table 2), some authors conclude that the impression of a 
high degree of dynamism (based on purely quantitative analysis) has to be 
somewhat qualified (ibid.; see also Grimm 1989: 1307). 
From a historical-structural point of view, we can conclude, the many 
changes in the German constitution are perceived as a process of "supple­
menting and completing a constitution that initially was consciously incom­
plete" and that "only won its full identity with the peak of the changes in 
the 1960s and 1970s." (Robbers 1989: 1324). 
3.2 The approach of constitutional revisionism 
While the position described in the previous paragraphs sees the develop­
ment of the Grundgesetz as a fleshing out of a provisional arrangement to 
achieve a full constitution, a competing position interprets that same pro­
cess to one of continuously dismantling the intended constitutional order of 
1949. It is not historical and structural forces that are at work, but rather 
a conscious political strategy of "constitutional revisionism" (Seifert 1977: 
15The incorporation took place in Article 143 of the Grundge.se.tz. Bauer/Jestaedt (1997: 
30) therefore oppose the usual counting of the act to amend the criminal law of 1951 as 
the first act amending the constitution - as is usually done. 
16See third amending act of April 20, 1953, fifth amending act of December 25, 1954 
and sixth amending act of December 23, 1955. 
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drafting, may no longer be functional due to social, economic or political 
change (Loewenstein 1961: 21). The Grundgesetz has been changed 190 
times in 50 years, as was demonstrated above. Undoubtedly, this is a degree 
of change that requires explanation (Bryde 1982: 121). In this chapter of the 
paper, three approaches will be presented and tested for their explanatory 
power, two of them from constitutional law, one from political science. 
3.1 The historical-structural approach 
As was already mentioned above, the analysis of the changes in the Grundge­
setz is not a very prominent topic amongst German constitutional lawyers. 
That is why it shouldn't come as a surprise that there are no detailed the­
ories about the reasons for the many amendments. The constitutional law 
literature mentioned above is dominated by an approach that focuses on the 
special circumstances under which the Grundgesetz was drafted and that 
sees the changes as a process primarily characterized by catching-up. The 
great incidence of changes can thus primarily be explained by the filling of 
"constitutional gaps" (Loewenstein 1961: 21). 
One of the main facts discussed is that Germany lacked full sovereignty at 
the time the constitution was drafted. There were a number of matters in the 
prerogative of the Allied Powers that the new constitution was not allowed to 
deal with, but that a "normal" constitution would deal with. Examples are 
regulations concerning defense or emergency measures which are completely 
lacking in the 1949 version of the Grundgesetz. Thus the numerous changes 
in the Grundgesetz that eventually incorporated these matters into the con­
stitution are interpreted as "postponed constitution drafting" (nachgeholte 
Verjassungsgebung)P The incorporation of matters like the use of nuclear 
energy and the setting up of an administration for air traffic control can be 
interpreted in a similar way.14 Besides these limitations of sovereignty, the 
great haste (for political reasons) that was characteristic of the conditions 
under which the Grundgesetz was drafted, is often mentioned. One conse­
quence was that on many matters there was no final agreement which led to 
their being changed in due time, or that temporary solutions were incorpo­
rated (Kommers 1989; Beyme 1996: 45). Examples here are the law of high 
treason and the fiscal constitution. Since the Allied Powers had repealed the 
political parts of criminal law, the law of high treason had to be incorporated 
13Cf. Bryde (1982: 120, 136), Hofmann (1987: 298; approvingly quoted by Kenntner 
1997: 453) and Grimm (1994: 376). 
HCr. Articles 74, Nr. lla and 87c, added in the tenth act of December 23, 1959 and 
Article 87d, added in the eleventh act on February 6, 1961. 
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the origin of modern constitutionalism is closely linked with the doctrine 
of popular sovereignty, and if we distinguish between pouvoir constituant 
and pouvoir constitue (Sieyes), then the constitution can be thought of as 
a means of circumscribing the powers of the state. It thus logically follows 
that any change in the constitution has to be ratified by the people in a 
meeting or through an assembly elected for this purpose. Even if considera­
tions of (im)practicability have - in most countries - led to an amendment 
procedure that is somewhat less demanding: the concept of the participation 
of the sovereign people in the process of constitutional amendment remains 
"characteristic" in most Western democracies (Bryde 1982: 52). 
The Grundgesetz is an exception here, since the legislature can change 
the constitution without any popular participation whatsoever. The consti­
tution's "rigidity" is only achieved through an increased quorum, namely the 
necessity of a two thirds majority of the members of the Bundestag and two 
thirds of the votes of the Bundesrat.18 Such a monopolisation of amendment 
power by the legislature is rare among constitutional democracies - besides 
the Federal Republic, it is only the case in Portugal if we look at the 16 
countries of the European Union.19 
But although such a procedure is rooted in a constitutional rather than a 
democratic tradition, the standard literature on the German political system 
emphasizes above all the difficulties of constitutional amendment. Schmidt 
(1992: 90ff.) speaks of the "high barriers [ ... J erected by the constitution's 
fathers to protect it", and the necessity to "overcome high barriers of consen­
sus". Hesse and Ellwein (1997: 397) emphasize the difficulties of obtaining 
the necessary majority, and Arend Lijphart (1999: 220) places Germany 
into the category with the highest degree of constitutional rigidity. Klaus 
von Beyme (1996: 45; 1984: 12) writes of "high" and even "unusually high 
barriers to amendment". 
Comparing them to the barriers erected in other countries qualifies these 
assessments strongly. In the Netherlands, for example, both chambers of 
18Cf. Article 79 No.2 GG. The Western Allies had initially planned that an amendment 
of the Gnmdgesetz should require a referendum on the level of the Lander. Two thh-ds 
of the Lander should have to agree (each with a simple majority) to pass an amendment. 
See the text of the Frankfurter Dolrument Nr.· 1 in Huber (1951: 198). 
1111n all other states, the citizens can either vote in a (sometimes optional) referendum, 
or in a general election that is mandated between the first and the second vote on the 
amendment in parliament. The United Kingdom as a state without a written consti­
tution - is a special case which also makes constitutional change without stated popular 
consent possible. See Gabriel/Brettschneider 1994: 464f. and Article 44 of the Anstrian 
Federal Constitution; Chapter 8, Article 15 of the Swedish Constitution; Article 67 of the 
Finnish Parliamentary Law. 
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30). For the many changes had led to a "systematic hollowing-out of the 
constitution's democratic content" (Abendroth 1974: 143). While at the 
time of its conception, the constitution's position had been one "to the 'left' 
of societal reality" (Ridder 1975: 17), its "anti-fascist, anti-militarist and 
anti-monopolist foundations" had in the meantime been watered down and 
disfigured through re-interpretations (Stuby 1974: 20). 
In this view, the main thrust of developments to come was already present 
in the first change of the constitution - the abolishment of Article 143 (high 
treason) -, which constituted the start of "repression [ ... J of ultimately 
all efforts critical of society" (ibid.: 22). Consequently, the development of 
the "state fragment", the Federal Republic, towards a fully-fledged state ­
mainly brought about through the incorporation of defense and emergency 
regulations into the constitution - is strongly criticized (cf. Abendroth 1966: 
47). These amendments created "more or less a new constitution" (Seifert 
1974: 35). The peak of the growing concentration of power at the federal 
level was supposedly reached with the introduction of the financial reforms 
in 1967 and 1969 - among them the executive's authorization to take out 
loans (Article 109 No.4 GG) which is seen to symbolize the "too far reaching 
self-emasculation of Parliament" (Neumark 1967: 43), and is regarded as an 
''instrument for the state-monopolistic programming of the economy" (Stuby 
1974: 23). Changes in the constitution were not limited to the content, but 
even "traditional institutions of the constitution had been liquidated almost 
unnoticed", as demonstrated by the deletion of Article 45 in 1976 (Seifert 
1977: 12).17 
Summarizing the position we can say that its supporters interpret the 
constitutional changes as a continuous process of bringing the Federal Repub­
lic's constitution into line with that of an authoritarian state, since the many 
negative amendments by far outweigh the very few positive ones (Seifert 
1977: 3lf., 46). 
3.3 	 An institutional approach, or: the myth of the difficult 
amendability of the Grundgesetz 
A third position focuses on the importance of institutions to explain the num­
ber of constitutional changes. The task of a constitution is to balance "sta­
bility" and "flexibility". In institutional terms, the tension between the two 
goals is characterized by the fact that constitutions are in principle amend­
able, but that - compared to laws - amendment is more difficult. Since 
17Article 45 created a "Permanent Committee" that represented Parliament in the time 
between two legislative periods. 
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Rate of change (per year) Country Institutional difficulty Rank 
I 
 New Zealand . 0.5 13.421 

0.8 6.32 
 Austria 
6.67Portugal 0.82 

1.4 4.72Sweden3 

1.6 2.914 
 Germany 
Greece 1.8 1.325 

1.8 1.8Luxemburg5 

Finland 2.3 0.866 

2.5France 0.197 

i 
 2.758 
 Denmark 0.17 
2.75 0.21Iceland8 

9 
 Belgium 2.85 2.3 
Ireland 0.5510 
 3 

Japan 3.1i 11 
 0 
Norway12 
 3.35 1.14 
I 
 13 
 Italy 0.243.4 
i 14 
 Spain 3.6 0.18 
15 
 Australia 4.65 0.09 
Switzerland 4.7516 
 0.78 
17 
 U.S.A. 5.1 0.13 
Table 3: Constitutional change in international comparison 
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parliament have to express their wish to change the constitution. They are 
then dissolved, and a general election is held. The new parliament then has 
to pass the amendment with a two thirds majority in both houses, and the 
king has to ratify it.20 The Danish constitution requires even more: both 
parliament and the administration have to indicate their wish to amend the 
constitution, followed by a general election. If the new parliament passes 
the amendment, there has to be a referendum within six months, in which ­
in addition to a simple majority of the votes 40 per cent of those entitled 
to vote have to approve the amendment.21 In federal states, such proce­
dures are often further complicated by bringing the constituent states into 
the game. Amending the constitution in the United States, for example, re­
quires a two-stage process, initiated either by a two-thirds majority in both 
houses of Congress, or by the approval of two thirds of the state legislatures 
followed by the investiture of a Constitutional Convention. In the second 
stage, the amendment requires the approval of three quarters of the state 
legislatures, or the approval of Conventions in three quarters of the states 
of the Union.22 This procedure is so (politically and otherwise) complicated 
that constitutional amendments are a rare thing: "Americans have availed 
themselves of the amending process only seventeen times since 1791, when 
the first ten amendments were adopted." (Ginsberg/Lowi/Weir 1997: 88).23 
In the light of such restraint, one is not too surprised to find an American 
observer, "committed to a 'great outlines' approach to constitutional crafts­
manship", sees the Grundgesetz as an "amendable charter" characterized by 
"an immense amount of constitutional tinkering" (Kommers 1989: 142). 
20 Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Articles 137-139. See Article 195 of 
the Belgian Constitution for a comparable procedure. 
21 See chapter 88 of the Danish Constitution. A good overview of requirements for 
constitutional amendment within the countries of the European Union can be found in 
Gabriel/Brettschneider 1994: 464f. 
22 Article V of the Constitution of the United States of America. 
23It should be noted, however, that the doctrine of "implied powers", together with the 
tradition of an extensive interpretation of general clauses such as the "interstate commerce 
clause" (Article I, chapter 8) has created a functional equivalent in terms of constitutional 
flexibility which made an adaption of the constitution to changed circumstances possible 
(cf. Ginsberg/LowifWeir 1997: 117f.) 
Faced with difficulties to find the necessary majority for a constitutional amendment, 
the assumption of "implied powers" was pondered by some in the Federal Republic during 
the debates about the defense amendment in order to avoid an amendment of the constitu­
tional text. This was rejected for fear of defeat before the Constitutional Court in the face 
of the unambiguity of Article 79 No.1 GG. In 1956, however, when the compromise on the 
defense amendments was hammered out, the SPD insisted on the insertion of Article 143 
into the constitution explicitly ruling out an "impled powers" construction for the future 
13 
the law of high treason was changed in 1951, not even the Communist op­
position in the Bundestag criticized changing the constitution by deleting 
Article 143 per se. Their strong criticism was directed against a number of 
regulations in the new law and above all against the implied enhancement 
of status for the provisional arrangement that was the Federal Republic: for 
the Communists held it that "no high treason was possible against such a 
merely state-like structure.,,28 The new regulations concerning high treason, 
however, were no different from the old ones contained in the Grundgesetz, 
except being more detailed. The claim that by deleting regulations on high 
treason from the Grundgesetz it was intended to reduce protection for the 
constitution simply does not stand up to the historical facts. A similar case 
is the alleged liquidation of a core institution with the abolishment of the 
Sti:indiger Ausschufl (permanent committee) of Article 45. Its task had been 
that of representing the interests of the Bundestag in the time between two 
parliamentary terms. But the abolishment of Article 45 took place simulta­
neously with a change in Article 39, which now stated that a parliamentary 
term only ended with the assembly of a new Parliament. Consequently, there 
was no longer any time "between" two parliamentary terms, which simply 
rendered the Standiger Ausschufl superfluous. These examples demonstrate 
the bias that characterizes the position of constitutional revisionism, which 
is also evident in its almost complete neglect of changes in the Grundge­
setz that expanded citizens' rights.29 It is taken to the extreme when the 
introduction of a right of resistance against anybody who undertakes it to 
abolish the constitutional order (Article 20 No.4) is interpreted as intended 
to potentially justify lynch-law (Seifert 1974: 37). 
The approach which focuses on historical-structural factors can, as was 
demonstrated, explain many constitutional changes that were a consequence 
of Germany's special historical situation after 1945, such as the amendments 
concerning defense or emergency measures and many of the interim arrange­
ments. Although most of the works advocating this approach were written in 
the early 1980s, it certainly would not pose a problem to incorporate the new 
"wave" of constitutional changes following unification by interpreting them 
as another special historical situation. But a great number of constitutional 
changes have no connection with historical circumstances, such as the con-
German constitutional law. 
28Communist representative Fisch in the 158. session of the 1. Bundestag, see 
Stenographische Berichte p. 6299 C. 
29 An example are the introduction of a popular right to file before the constitutional 
court about violation of basic rights in 1969 (Article 93 (1) 4a) or the lowering of the 
voting age in 1970 (Article 38 (2)). 
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A systematic comparison of 20 OEeD countries concerning procedure 
and frequency of constitutional amendments is instructive (Lutz 1994). It 
can be demonstrated that there is substantial variation on both counts, and 
that the Grundgesetz is among those constitutions where amendments are 
most easily possible. As Table 3 demonstrates, the German constitution 
displays a low rate of "difficulty" in terms of the amendment procedure, 
indicating that it is relatively easy to change.24 In addition, the data show 
a clearly inverse relationship between this "difficulty" and the frequency of 
change in the constitution: the lower the procedural hurdle, the more often a 
constitution is amended.25 The Grundgesetz, with an average annual rate of 
nearly 3 changes per year,26 is in the top group, ranking fifth among twenty 
countries. 
An internationally comparative perspective can thus convincingly demon­
strate that - quite to the contrary of received wisdom - the German con­
stitution is relatively easy to change. Assumptions about the height of the 
hurdles to be passed should be accordingly corrected. At the same time, it 
becomes evident that institutional requirements seem to play an important 
role in the changes in the Grundgesetz. From this point of view, it seems 
that the frequ.ency of change is to a large extent a function of the condi­
tions for change. This entails a considerable qualification of approaches that 
see German constitutional change as primarily shaped by forces of historical 
necessity or political will of the governing majority. 
3.4 Comparing and assessing the approaches 
The three different approaches outlined above for explaining changes in the 
Grundgesetz are rather different in their explanatory power. 
The approach focusing on constitutional revisionism seems the least con­
vincing. Many of the accusations raised by its supporters appear unfounded 
upon closer scrutiny.27 Two examples may serve to demonstrate this: when 
amendment concerning emergency measures (Schaub 1984: 55f.). 
24This indicator measures the relative difficulty of an amendment procedure. It varies 
in the countries under consideration between a simple vote of parliament passed with 
absolute majority (New Zealand) and the procedure in the United States described in the 
text. Author's calculations after the index given in Lutz 1994. I am grateful to Donald 
Lutz for access to hitherto unpublished material. 
2~The rank correlation coefficient between the two variables is r = -0,785. 
26The Lutz data go only up to 1992, which is why there is a discrepancy with the rate 
of change given in chapter 2 on page 7. 
27Cf. also Beyme 1996: 46. Anyway this approach seems strongly time-bound and a 
phenomenon of the 19705 Zeitgeist which today has no longer any serious followers in 
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of inertia within an established system, however, it seemed highly unlikely to 
him that there should be much change with respect to the basic institutional 
"rules of the game". Lastly, changes in the catalogue of Basic Rights seemed 
out of the question to him, and in general he expected the number of changes 
to go down in the future since a "full constitution" had been created in the 
meantime without any major gaps. 
4.1 	 The Grundgesetz: Still stable in its foundations and flex­
ible in its catalogues? 
Although the unexpected development of German unification carried with it 
a great number of constitutional changes, Bryde's first two hypotheses can be 
corroborated: the composition and the competences of the organs of the state 
remained unchanged, except for the introduction of regulations concerning 
further European integration and a re-weighting of votes in the Bundesrat as 
a consequence of the greater number of Lander following German unification. 
And the main focus of changes indeed was - as expected in the chapters 
dealing with legislative competences (23 changes), Bund and Lander, and 
implementation and administration of laws (7 changes each) (see Table 1 
on page 6).32 The constitution's Hexibility in its catalogues thus still exists 
- and it has been further increased. Provisions that are changed or newly 
introduced often grow into a degree of detail more associated with legal than 
with constitutional regulations. This appears often to be the consequence 
of long-winded negotiations in the "grand coalition state" which is Oermany 
(Schmidt 1996). While it enables compromises in principle, it does so at 
the cost of disabling any future Hexibility short of another constitutional 
amendment.33 
Concerning the "stability of the foundations", however, the expectations 
have been confounded - at least to some degree. In recent years, three acts34 
have made changes in the chapter on Basic Rights, while in the previous 45 
years only two acts had done so - the seventh (defense) and the 17th (emer­
gency measures). Besides extending the scope of the Article 3 (Equality),35 
32There was less change than expected in the chapter dealing with the fiscal constitution. 
This was, however, not for want of a need for change quite to the contrary: the Joint 
Constitutional Commission assumed this to be too complicated a set of questions to deal 
with it in the two years allocated to it (see the commission's report, p. 114). 
33Examples are the changes of Articles 13, 16a and 23 GG. 
34The 39th, 42th and 45th amending acts. 
3sThe legal relevance of this extension is contested by some, d. Seifert/Romig 1995: 76 
as well as the (negative) assessment of the Joint Constitutional Committee in its report 
(1993: 52f.) 
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tinuous changes concerning legislative powers of the Bund and the Lander, or 
changes in the fiscal constitution. The argument of changing technical and 
social circumstances does also not appear to be too convincing: for other 
countries have managed the transition to "modern" times without a similar 
amount of constitutional amendments. In this respect, it seems more instruc­
tive to look at the structural particularities of the German constitution. It 
is certainly not subject to Talleyrand's alleged demand that constitutions 
should be "brief and opaque": rather, it contains detailed regulations (e.g. of 
periods of time )30 and enumerations, especially in chapter VII and Articles 
106 and 107 which literally enforce periodic constitutional amendments. We 
must keep in mind that "there is a direct relationship between a constitution's 
precision of regulation and its need for change." (Grimm 1994: 333f.). 
This need for change, however, can only be translated into actual change 
because of institutional provisions. As the institutional approach demon­
strates, the German constitution is among the most easily amendable in 
OEeD countries. The latter approach also has the advantage of not being 
exclusively focused on Germany, but of inquiring about general principles 
of constitutional change. Its result is: the more easily constitutions can be 
changed, the more often they will be changed. The explanation of the many 
changes in the Grundgesetz, we can conclude, it thus best given by a combi­
nation of structural and institutional factors. We can therefore hypothesize 
that the need for change in the Grundgesetz has not been pacified yet and 
that there will be constitutional amendments in the future as well. 
Concluding considerations 
Tp.is paper, not least for restrictions of space, cannot aim at giving a com­
prehensive appreciation of fifty years of constitutional policy in the Federal 
Republic. It can, however, test whether expectations concerning future de­
velopments of the constitution that were raised in previous analyses of the 
Grundgesetz ten to fifteen years ago were fulfilled. Only Brun-Otto Bryde 
(1982: 136-138) put forward explicit hypotheses. His analysis can be summa· 
rized as follows: stability in the foundations, flexibility in the catalogues.31 
Bryde expected further changes in the more casuistic ally-styled parts of the 
Grundgesetz such as those governing the relationship between Bund and 
Lander, legislative powers and the fiscal constitution. Given the high degree 
30ef. Articles 38, 39, 51, 76 and 77 GG. 
31This means the largely enumerative parts of the constitution that deal for example 
with the distribution of legislative powers or tax revenues. 
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of substantial constitutional changes like restrictions of Basic Rights, can be 
interpreted in two ways: it can be an expression of an alienation from the 
constitution, or it can signal agreement. The first case would be a worrying 
sign of an endangered" Verfassungsgefuhl" (Loewenstein), a lack of com­
munal thinking within the state's population. Further integration through 
increased participation could help to strengthen that communal feeling again 
and clarify the shared responsibility of all citizens towards the conservation 
and development of their constitution. In the second case, it would surely be 
good if agreement towards constitutional change could be actively expressed. 
Thus in any case popular participation in constitutional amendments would 
be preferable over the present state of affairs - and also theoretically justi­
fied as protection of the people from "its representatives if they agree" (Bryde 
1982: 54). 
It has to be kept in mind, however, that the special characteristics of the 
Grundgesetz mentioned above make some qualifications necessary. Specif­
ically the very detailed regulations of federal relations (legislative powers, 
fiscal matters) as well as the mentioning of specific periods of time and num­
bers make for an increased need for change in the German constitution. 
Continuous referenda about such matters could quickly reverse the intended 
effect of raising legitimacy. Since it does not seem appropriate to exclude cer­
tain parts of the constitution from popular participation, it seems preferable 
to introduce a facultative referendum which would be triggered by a mo­
tion supported by a quarter of the members of the Bundestag.38 The many 
more or less unanimously passed constitutional changes of a more technical 
nature could thus be spared from having to undergo a referendum, while 
a sufficiently large minority of representatives would be allowed to refer a 
contested constitutional amendment to the people. The constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Germany would thus become more like most other Eu­
ropean constitutions and would make the transition from a constitutional to 
a democratic tradition. 
38Such a referendum is optional rather than obligatory. Provisions for such referenda 
can be found e.g. in the constitutions of Denmark, Greece or Italy (Butler/Ranney 1994: 
30£.). Only the Danish case provides for a parliamentary minority to trigger a referendum. 
Contrary to the solution proposed here, in the Danish case this is only applicable for normal 
legislation, since constitutional amendments require a referendum anyway (see above, page 
13). 
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the right to asylum (Article 16a) and the inviolability of the home (Article 
13) have been substantially restricted. While these changes were subject 
to considerable political debate, in neither cases was there a political mass 
mobilisation on the scale characteristic of the amendments in the 1950s and 
1960s.36 
4.2 Completing the normalisation of the Grundgesetz 
In the fifty years of its existence, the Federal Republic of Germany has 
undergone a number of processes of normalisation. From a "construction akin 
to a state" (Carlo Schmid) it grew into a normal state over time. This process 
was completed domestically with German unification and in terms of foreign 
policy with the Two-pIus-Four Treaty. In parallel, the "Basic Law", through 
the addition of missing provisions, grew from an interim arrangement into 
a full constitution. I would like to argue that these developments should 
be complemented with a process that normalises the German citizenry's 
relationship with its constitution. 
The Grundgesetz was adopted in 1949 without a referendum,37 and in 
1990 no referendum was held to legitimize the now all-German constitution. 
Thus for the foreseeable future, the German people is likely to have foregone 
an opportunity to exercise its power of adopting a constitution. In prac­
tice, this power often doesn't correspond to the theoretical fiction anyway 
(Beyme 1968). But that is why one has to ask whether popular participa­
tion should not be at least the case of the constitution is amended. Karl 
Loewenstein remarked nearly forty years ago that none of the (already then) 
numerous constitutional amendments - with the exception of that on defense 
- "had inspired the least bit of interest in the public" (Loewenstein 1961: 60). 
He wondered whether this not meant having to draw the conclusion "that 
the Grundgesetz as supreme order had remained alien to the great mass of 
people to whom it addressed itself''? Others have likewise asked how ''the 
'will' and the 'popular sentiment' towards the constitution can come to exist 
and be maintained, if citizens don't have an opportunity to contribute to 
constitutional amendments and revisions?" (Steinberg 1980: 392). 
The low degree of political mobilization mentioned above, even in the case 
360n the la.tter controversies see Baring 1969, esp. pp. 261-293, Schwarz 1981 and 
Schaub 1984: 187ff., 213ff. as well as Oberreuter 1978 and Ellwein 1973: 458-470. 
37 Quite contrary to present positions, the SPD was then opposed to a referendum in 
order to emphasize the transitional character of the Grundgesetz, while the CDU favoured 
a referendum beca.use of the principle of popular sovereignty. The SPD's position prevailed 
(Eschenburg/Benz 1983: 509). 
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